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NANOTECHNOLOGY: GETTING IT RIGHT THE FIRST TIME

N

by Karen Florini, Scott Walsh, John M. Balbus, and Richard Denson*
INTRODUCTION

anotechnology, the design and manipulation of materials
at the atomic scale, may well revolutionize many of the
ways our society manufactures products, produces energy, and treats diseases. Hundreds of large and small nanotechnology companies are developing a wide variety of materials for use
in electronics, medical diagnostic tools and therapies, construction materials, personal care products, paints and coatings, environmental cleanup, energy production and conservation, environmental sensors, and many other important applications. The
National Science Foundation predicts that the global market for
nanomaterial products could reach $1 trillion within a decade.1
Deliberate exploitation of properties evident only at the
nanoscale is central to these applications. Such properties
include the large surface area of various nanomaterials, which
arise from their tiny particle size, absorption and radiation of
highly specific wavelengths of light, ability to penetrate cellular
barriers, and high tensile strength and durability. Carefully controlled, these properties may provide highly beneficial products.
However, these new and enhanced properties also raise the possibility of unintended and adverse consequences, both for
human health and for the environment. For example, the same
binding properties that allow nanomaterials to deliver therapeutics to cancer cells might also allow nanomaterials with these
properties to deliver toxic substances to aquatic organisms.
Likewise, the electrical properties that drive applications in
computers may lead to oxidative damage in living tissues. It is
in the best interest of companies and society that these potential
harms are identified prospectively, and are addressed, ideally
through material design, or alternatively, through safeguards on
production, use, or disposal.
Available data, while limited in scope, clearly indicate both
that some nanomaterials have hazardous properties and that
growing numbers of nanomaterials are reaching the market.
Unfortunately, it is far from clear whether existing federal regulatory programs will provide an effective means of addressing
nanomaterial risks, particularly in the foreseeable future. As an
interim measure, several voluntary initiatives to develop standards for the safe production, use, and disposal of nanomaterials
are now underway. The rigor of such standards, the degree to
which mandatory safeguards are adopted, and the extent to which
risk-related data are generated prior to widespread dispersion of
nanomaterials will jointly indicate whether previous technological mishaps will be avoided in developing nanotechnology.

WHY “GETTING IT RIGHT THE FIRST TIME” IS IN
THE NANOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY’S INTEREST

Environmental law is replete with illustrations of how ignorance failed to produce bliss for industry, workers, consumers,
the public, and the environment. When the harmful effects of
SPRING 2006

asbestos were widely recognized, years after the material had
been extensively distributed in commerce, many makers and
users of asbestos products found themselves embroiled in costly litigation brought by victims and their families. As of 2002,
more than half a million people had filed claims related to
asbestos exposure.2 Notably, five corporations have spent more
than $1 billion each on asbestos litigation; indeed, one company alone recently agreed to pay more than $4 billion to settle
pending claims for asbestos exposure.3 Standard & Poor’s has
estimated that the total cost of liability for asbestos-related losses could reach $200 billion.4
Tort liability is not the only route by which actions that are
lawful today can become major headaches for industry tomorrow. In 1980, the U.S. Congress enacted the Superfund law,
under which dumpsite operators, along with those who generate
or transport the wastes, are legally responsible for cleaning up
properties contaminated by toxic wastes, regardless of whether
the contamination arose from illegal activities.5 Indeed, under
Superfund’s “joint and several liability” provisions, a company
that contributes any amount, no matter how small, to the contamination of a Superfund site may, theoretically, be held liable
for the cleanup of the entire site (though the company can then
seek cost-recovery against other contributors).6 To date, the
industry has expended more than $20 billion in remediation and
related costs.7
Even without conclusive proof linking a new technology or
material to an environmental or health harm, companies may be
severely penalized for failing to demonstrate the safety of their
products at the onset. When European nations contested the
safety of bioengineered foods, their refusal to accept imports of
such foods cost U.S. farmers an estimated $300 million annually in lost crop export revenues.
Each of these examples illustrates that the failure to identify and address the risks – real or perceived – of new technologies and materials can lead to immense costs, from financial and
managerial perspectives, as well as from human and environmental standpoints.8
At present, most consumers have such limited familiarity
with nanotechnology that they have formed few impressions.
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However, a recent study provided basic information on nanotechnology to representative groups of citizens in three locations. After reviewing that information, a substantial majority of
participants said that although they anticipate major benefits
from nanotechnology, they are concerned that industry is pushing products into the market without conducting adequate safety testing.9 As nanotechnology products continue to increase
their presence in the market and in the news, such views may
become more widespread. Indeed, although relatively few studies have been conducted on nanomaterials, the initial results
have identified surprising, hazardous properties, i.e. intrinsic
abilities to cause adverse effects. At the same time, the rapid
pace of commercialization suggests that the potential for human
and environmental exposure will grow dramatically. Available
information on both of these elements of risk – hazard and exposure – is briefly summarized below. Complicating the process of
both obtaining and evaluating such information is the lack of an
agreed-upon system for naming and uniquely describing nanomaterials of various structures and the limited ability to detect
and characterize nanomaterials in many biological and environmental media.

NANOMATERIAL HAZARDS: FLASHING YELLOW LIGHTS

The inherent nature and novel properties of certain nanomaterials, and the results from many of the relatively small
number of nanotoxicity studies conducted to date, lead to concerns about nanomaterials’ health and safety impacts. Many of
the very properties that make
nanomaterials useful also raise
the potential for these materials
to present novel mechanisms and
targets of toxicity. For a given
mass of particles, surface area
increases dramatically as the
diameter of the individual particles decreases. This increased
surface-area-to-mass
ratio
appears to be a critical feature in
understanding some aspects of
the toxicity of nanomaterials. For example, in a study comparing the toxicity of conventional versus nano-sized particles of
titanium dioxide, the nanoparticles appeared significantly more
toxic than the conventional particles when the dose was reported on a mass basis, but this distinction essentially disappeared
when the dose was reported on a surface area basis.10 The higher surface area also leads to higher particle surface energy,
which may translate into higher reactivity.11 Lastly, the combination of high surface area and small size may give nanoparticles unusual, catalytic reactivity, such as those seen with gold
nanoparticles.12 This combination of enhanced surface area and
enhanced surface activity lends far greater complexity to the
characterization of nanoparticles when compared to bulk and
conventional substances, and also precludes easy extrapolation
about potential toxicity.
Moreover, at least some nanoparticles can readily penetrate
cell membranes, which enables them to deliver targeted drug

therapies. Evidence suggests that some nanoparticles can also
cross physiologic barriers (including the lung-blood, bloodbrain, and placental barriers), and can enter body compartments
that neither larger particles nor smaller molecules can readily
access. One study of twenty nanometer polystyrene beads suggests that they enter cells by passing directly through membranes, without requiring specific transport mechanisms. Once
inside the cells, the nanoparticles distribute throughout the cytoplasm and appear to bind to a variety of key cellular structures.13
Surface modifications may allow nanoparticles to bind to
cell surface receptors and potentially to interact with internal
cell structures.14 Subtle variations in nanoparticle surfaces,
whether due to intentional coating prior to entry into the body,
unintentional surface binding, or coating degradation once
inside the body, can have dramatic impacts on where and how
nanoparticles gain entry into organs and cells, as well as where
and how they are transported after entry. These complexities
increase the difficulty of understanding nanomaterial hazards.
In addition to these inherent characteristics, the limited
empirical data available adds to the concerns. As of yet, no studies on any nanomaterial’s reproductive toxicity, immunotoxicity, developmental toxicity, or chronic health effects, such as
cancer, have been published, although some are underway.15
The limited number of short-term studies completed to date
demonstrate a variety of adverse effects. Studies in which single-walled carbon nanotubes (“SWCNTs”) were implanted into
the lungs of rodents have consistently demonstrated that they cause
unusual lung granulomas and have
shown other signs of lung inflammation.16 Moreover, one study found
that SWCNTs also cause dosedependent, diffuse interstitial fibrosis, a form of lung disease.17 A study
of multi-walled carbon nanotubes
(“MWCNTs”) showed similar lung
toxicity, especially after the
MWCNTs were finely ground.18
Single- and multi-walled carbon
nanotubes also induce oxidative damage to skin cells, which can
result in membrane damage that leads to cell death.19 These
studies raise questions of potential toxicity at the beginning and
end of the carbon nanotube (“CNT”) lifecycle. This can occur
through workplace exposures or when CNT-containing products
undergo weathering, erosion, or grinding during recycling or
disposal.
The toxicity of C60 fullerenes (commonly known as buckyballs) is particularly unclear at present. Computer modeling suggests that fullerenes can bind to DNA and have “negative impact
on the structure, stability, and biological functions of DNA molecules.”20 As a result, if fullerenes gain access to cell nuclei,
they may interfere with critical cellular machinery. While
fullerenes are insoluble as single particles, they can form crystalline aggregates that are readily soluble in water; these aggregates appear to be toxic to bacteria.21 In addition, studies in fish

Presently, quantitative
data on exposure to
nanomaterials are
almost nonexistent.
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have shown that fullerenes can be transported via the gills from
water to the brain, where they can cause oxidative damage to
brain cell membranes.22 Uncoated fullerenes have also been
found to cause oxidative stress in in vitro testing systems, i.e.
cell-based systems as distinguished from whole-organism
ones.23 However, some scientists have questioned whether
observed toxicity is caused by contaminants, specifically organic solvents, rather than the fullerenes themselves, and have
pointed to studies that show negligible toxicity and even protective effects from pristine fullerenes that are made into water-soluble aggregates, without the use of organic solvents.24 This
alternate hypothesis, however, disregards indications that the
fullerene aggregates produced without solvents are significantly
larger, and thus less able to penetrate cells, than those formed
with solvents. This ongoing debate highlights the importance of
understanding nanomaterials’ physical form, as well as the limitations of current scientific understanding about nanomaterial
toxicity.
Finally, quantum dots can be composed of a variety of
inherently toxic materials, including cadmium and lead. Because
some of the key potential applications of quantum dots include
diagnostic imaging and medical
therapeutics, quantum dots have
been studied relatively extensively in biological systems.
However, only a small portion of
this research has focused on
potential toxicity, and those studies performed to date have mainly
been in vitro assays. While results
have been somewhat inconsistent,
studies that used longer exposure
times were more likely to demonstrate significant toxicity.25 Inorganic elements typically make
up the core of quantum dots, but these elements are generally
coated with organic materials, such as polyethylene glycol, in
order to enhance their biocompatibility or target them to specific organs or cells. While many coatings initially decrease toxicity by one or more orders of magnitude, the coatings might
degrade when exposed to air or ultraviolet light, which could
lead to toxicity increases. While the presumption has been that
this cytotoxicity is caused by leakage of cadmium or selenium
from the core, there is evidence that some of the molecules used
as coatings may have independent toxicity.26

porated into tennis rackets, automobile running boards, or other
products. Although risk of exposure to these nanotubes (which,
as noted above, have been shown to damage lung tissue)27
appears minimal during product use, pre- and post-use exposure
must also be considered. Such exposure may occur during the
manufacture of the product and its components, or during disposal, recycling, or reclamation. Human and environmental
exposure during these other stages may be substantial. For
instance, although computer users are highly unlikely to inhale
carbon nanotubes bound in their computer screen, the exposure
potential may dramatically increase if recyclers ultimately grind
up those screens for other uses, such as road aggregate. Human
exposure is most obvious for the workers doing the grinding, but
may also harm road-construction workers, travelers, and neighbors as the road’s surface weathers with time and traffic.
Occupational exposure to researchers and students may also
occur in research and development settings. In sum, it is necessary to consider a product’s complete lifecycle in order to understand the effects of exposure and address risks effectively.
Presently, quantitative data on
exposure to nanomaterials are almost nonexistent. However, sources
indicate that numerous nanomaterial-containing products are entering
commerce, thus creating the potential for human and environmental
exposure at various stages of their
lifecycles. According to the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”), “a survey by EmTech Research of companies working in the
field of nanotechnology has identified approximately 80 consumer
products, and over 600 raw materials, intermediate components and
industrial equipment items that are used by manufacturers,”
though detailed results of this survey do not appear to be public.28 Lux Research, a nanotechnology research and advisory
firm, projected in 2004 that: “Sales of products incorporating
emerging nanotechnology will rise from less than 0.1 percent of
global manufacturing output today to fifteen percent in 2014, totaling $2.6 trillion. This value will approach the size of the information technology and telecom industries combined.”29 More
informally, an eBay search using the word “nano” produces
items such as golf clubs, tennis racquets, face lotions, and sun
blocks; notably, however, these references may reflect marketing
initiatives rather than actual nanomaterial use. Certain nanomaterials are also readily available for direct purchase, as illustrated by a Google search producing sources for nanotubes, buckyballs, quantum dots, and metal oxide nanoparticles.
Other information suggests that nanomaterial uses and
exposures in the United States are about to increase significantly. For example, the President’s Council of Advisors on Science
and Technology concluded in a 2005 report that the United
States is the world leader in nanotechnology by a variety of

[T]he pace of the
regulatory process lags
far behind the speed at
which nanomaterials
are being introduced
into the market.

NANOMATERIAL EXPOSURES: A LIFECYCLE VIEW

Some nanomaterials now on the market, and others in
development, can clearly result in human and environmental
exposures to nanoparticles. Examples include uses in drugs and
cosmetics, and remediation of groundwater contamination.
However, other products may also lead to substantial exposure, though the exposure does not necessarily occur during a
product’s useful life. For example, nanotubes or other nanomaterials embedded within resins or other matrices may be incorSPRING 2006
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measures, including public and private spending, numbers of
start-up companies, and numbers of scientific research articles.
The NanoBusiness Alliance states that there are 613 companies
involved with nanotechnology within the United States, while
noting that “it is notoriously difficult to track commercial developments in nanotechnology, so [the Alliance] cannot be precisely sure.”30 Likewise, the dramatic growth in the number of nanotechnology patents issued by the U.S. Patent Office suggests
that increasing numbers of nanomaterials are being introduced
into the market.31
With the commercialization of more products containing
nanomaterials comes the risk for more human and environmental
exposure, which lends urgency to the need for understanding the
potential hazards of nanomaterials. It also raises the questions of
whether, and how carefully, regulators are reviewing the lifecycle
impacts of these new materials before they reach the market.

NANOMATERIAL RISKS: WILL EXISTING REGULATORY
PROGRAMS PROTECT WORKERS, THE PUBLIC, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT?

Effectively managing nanomaterials’ potential risks will
prove to be a challenge for existing occupational and environmental regulatory frameworks for
at least five reasons. First, in most
of the current regulatory programs, standards and their exemptions are based on mass and mass
concentration. Because of their
high surface-area-to-mass ratios,
and enhanced surface activity,
nanomaterials are likely to prove
potent at far lower concentration
levels than envisioned when these
thresholds were initially set.
Second, although regulators
can often reasonably predict at
least some types of toxicity for
new conventional materials based
on extrapolation from conventional materials having a similar chemical structure, too little is currently known about nanomaterials to enable such extrapolation.
Third, it appears that many nanomaterials are being developed in a decentralized fashion, with a significant percentage of
production coming from small, dispersed facilities. As a result,
the sheer number of facilities involved will hamper the gathering of information on which materials are produced, and the
purpose and specific applications of the materials, as well as
directing compliance and enforcement efforts to where they are
needed. Additionally, much of the production, processing, and
use of these materials will take place in facilities that may lack
the expertise and resources to understand and comply with environmental and occupational safeguards.
Fourth, some potential nanotechnology applications may
fall through the cracks among the jurisdictions of multiple regulatory programs. For example, the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) reviewed sunscreens using nanoparticles of titani-

um dioxide for potential of immediate health effects on consumers.32 However, neither the FDA nor the EPA appears to
have reviewed how titanium dioxide nanoparticles could affect
aquatic ecosystems once these sunscreens wash off.
Lastly, the pace of the regulatory process lags far behind the
speed at which nanomaterials are being introduced into the market. While substances marketed as pesticides,33 fuel additives,34
or drug or food additives35 regularly receive significant scrutiny
when first introduced, most other substances do not.36 As a
result, occupational and environmental protections are generally developed only after problems are identified or strongly suspected in regulatory proceedings that typically take several
years to complete. A more detailed discussion of specific regulatory issues under key U.S. laws follows.

U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Act

Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(“OSHAct”),37 four types of regulatory mechanisms are available for protecting workers from overexposure to chemicals:
substance-specific standards, general respiratory protection
standards, hazard communication standards, and the “general
duty clause.” Each is examined below.
As a practical matter, substance-specific occupational standards are unlikely to be set in the
absence of extensive toxicology
data. Currently, the vast majority of
standards adopted have been based
on findings of human epidemiological studies, which follow widespread exposure and take years, or
even decades, to conduct. Given the
relative paucity of health data on
nanoparticles, it is unlikely that any
nanoparticle-specific standards will
be established in the reasonable
future. In their absence, inhalable
nanoparticles will automatically be
covered by the 5 micrograms per
cubic meter (“mg/m3”) standard that applies to “particulates not
otherwise regulated,” sometimes called “nuisance dust.”38
Unfortunately, these mass-based standards, developed for conventional particles, are unlikely to protect workers from adverse
effects of nanoparticle exposures; indeed, one study has suggested that exposure to carbon nanotubes at 5 mg/m3 for several weeks would be analogous to exposure levels found to cause
lung granulomas and inflammation in rats.39
Second, the respiratory protection standard requires
employers to provide workers with respirators or other protective devices when engineering controls are not adequate to protect health.40 The standard provides guidance in selecting specific personal protective equipment and in implementing workplace respiratory protection programs. Only respirators certified
by the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health may
be used, and employers must assess the effectiveness of the respirators they supply. The current lack of validated means to

[V]oluntary “standards
of care” for
nanomaterials must
play a role in guiding
the safe use of
nanomaterials in the
near term.

49

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

measure and characterize the form and size of nanoparticles in
the air, as well as the uncertainties regarding respirator performance, especially in relation to particles between 30 and 70
nanometers and potential agglomerates around 300 nanometers,
will complicate implementation of this standard.41
Third, OSHAct’s hazard communication standard42 stipulates that all producers or importers of chemicals are obligated
to develop Material Safety Data Sheets (“MSDSs”), which are
intended to provide workers with available information on hazardous ingredients in products they handle and educate them on
safe handling practices. However, even when accurate and upto-date, MSDSs have significant limitations; most notably, there
is no requirement to either generate data on potential hazards or
disclose the absence of any data. Moreover, in some instances,
a nanomaterial’s MSDS has simply adopted the hazard profile
for a presumedly-related bulk material. For example, an MSDS
for carbon nanotubes identifies the primary component as
graphite, and cites information on the hazards of graphite, without acknowledging any dissimilarity between the two substances.43 From a scientific perspective, this makes no more
sense than considering carbon nanotubes equivalent to diamonds. While graphite, diamonds, and carbon nanotubes are all
composed of carbon, the physical and chemical properties of
these three substances are quite distinct, reflecting their radically different molecular structures.
Finally, OSHAct’s general duty clause44 is intended as a
backstop to protect workers from certain exposures that are
widely known to result in toxic effects but are not addressed
specifically by an OSHA standard. The general duty clause,
however, applies only to “recognized” hazards, a difficult criterion to meet in light of the current paucity of toxicity data on
specific nanomaterials.

U.S. Toxic Substances Control Act

Beyond the occupational realm, the array of potential environmental regulatory authorities initially appears impressive.
These include the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the
Resources Conservation and Recovery Act, which addresses
management of hazardous and other solid wastes, and the Toxic
Substances Control Act (“TSCA”), which covers commercial
chemicals other than those used as drugs, food additives, cosmetics, fuel additives, and pesticides. Yet, most existing regulations under these statutes are not directly relevant to nanomaterials. Moreover, adopting new standards would require that the
EPA launch lengthy, data-intensive rulemaking processes that
would take years to complete.45
Certain provisions of TSCA, however, currently apply and
may be the most immediate way for the EPA to regulate at least
some nanomaterial applications. Enacted in 1976, TSCA authorizes the EPA to regulate chemicals that are processed, imported,
manufactured, distributed in commerce, used, or disposed of in
the United States upon finding that they pose an “unreasonable
risk.”46 As further discussed below, TSCA also has certain provisions under which the EPA can review the safety of new
chemicals before they enter commerce. “New” chemicals, as
defined by the TSCA, are those not included in the initial
SPRING 2006

Inventory of Chemicals in Commerce completed in 1980, or
subsequently added to the Inventory after going through the
new-chemical review process.47 As of 2005, the EPA had
reviewed more than 40,000 new chemicals prior to their introduction into commerce, and had restricted or otherwise regulated 1,600, or four percent, of these chemicals.48
At first blush, TSCA appears to provide the EPA with a fairly broad authority to regulate new chemicals. As noted in the
Conference Report accompanying TSCA’s enactment:
[T]he most desirable time to determine the health and
environmental effects of a substance, and to take action
to protect against any potential adverse effects, occurs
before commercial production begins. Not only is
human and environmental harm avoided or alleviated,
but also the cost of any regulatory action in terms of
loss of jobs and capital investments is minimized. For
these reasons the conferees have given the
Administrator broad authority to act during the [premanufacture] notification period.49

Specifically, section 5 of TSCA requires the producer of a
“new” chemical substance to send EPA a “Pre-Manufacture
Notification” (“PMN”) before beginning to produce a substance. At least in theory, PMNs allow the EPA to review and
assess the potential risks of a new material before it reaches the
market and, if necessary, to require that a producer provide further information, or limit the chemical’s use.
Unfortunately, there are no baseline data requirements for
PMNs, and 85 percent of PMNs are submitted without any
health data.50 Although the EPA can request additional data, it
rarely does so; instead, it typically conducts its review based on
use of structure-activity relationship models. This model estimates the toxicological properties of an unstudied substance,
based on the extent of molecular structural similarity to substances with known toxicological properties. Existing models
have little applicability to nanomaterials, because the models
are based on the properties of bulk forms of conventional chemical substances, and because nanomaterials’ novel and enhanced
properties result from characteristics other than their molecular
structure, e.g. size or shape. It remains to be seen whether the
EPA will require actual toxicity data on nanomaterials to be submitted as part of the PMN review process.
Other key questions also remain unresolved, including the
extent to which nanomaterials qualify as “new” chemicals, which
is necessary to trigger PMN requirements. Under TSCA, a “new”
chemical is one that is not already listed on the TSCA Inventory
of chemicals in commerce and is of “a particular molecular identity.”51 Although it is obvious that a nanomaterial constitutes a
“new” chemical if its molecular formula is not already on the
TSCA Inventory, some parties assume that a nanomaterial qualifies as “existing,” i.e. not new and therefore not subject to PMN
review, if its molecular structure is identical to a substance
already on the Inventory. By this logic, carbon nanotubes would
not require PMNs, because graphite is already listed on the TSCA
Inventory. As of January 2006, only about ten PMNs or PMN
50

exemption requests had been submitted to the EPA, even though
a much larger number of nanomaterials appear on the market in
the United States.52 Of these, the EPA had approved only one: a
low-release/low-exposure PMN exemption for a carbon nanotube,53 under which the manufacturer typically must submit a
full PMN once production exceeds a specified volume.
Environmental Defense has urged the EPA to clarify that
nanomaterials with existing molecular structures still constitute
“new” substances unless their chemical and physical properties
are demonstrably identical to those of the conventional substance. This definition is based on the grounds that only substances with the same properties, as well as the same molecular
structure, share “a particular molecular identity.”54
Environmental Defense also urged the EPA not to apply massbased, or other exemptions in the PMN program, unless the
underlying scientific rationale is appropriate when applied to
nanomaterials.55
In addition to its pre-manufacture review provisions, TSCA
also provides for certain information-gathering authorities. For
example, section 8(a) authorizes the EPA to require that manufacturers provide use and exposure information; section 8(e)
requires manufacturers to submit any information indicating
that a substance may pose a “significant risk” to health or to the
environment; and section 8(d) authorizes the EPA to require
manufacturers to submit all toxicity-related studies already in
their possession. As further discussed below, the EPA is currently conducting a multi-stakeholder process on nanomaterial risks
in order to design a voluntary initiative and consider possible
uses of TSCA authorities.
Finally, section 6 of TSCA theoretically authorizes the EPA
to restrict the manufacture, processing, distribution in commerce,
use, and disposal of chemical substances if “there is a reasonable
basis to conclude” that its manufacture, distribution in commerce, use, or disposal “presents or will present an unreasonable
risk of injury to health or the environment.”56 However, as a
practical matter, the procedural requirements associated with
section 6 are so complex that these provisions have seldom been
used.57

Federal Consumer Products Laws

As noted above, TSCA does not cover certain chemical substances. In particular, TSCA does not cover pesticides, which
the EPA regulates under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act. TSCA additionally does not cover food, food
additives, drugs, cosmetics, or medical devices, which the FDA
regulates under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
However, although cosmetics are excluded from TSCA, they are
not subject to FDA pre-market approval authority.58 As also is
noted above, fuel additives, including a nanomaterial-based
additive now under review by the EPA,59 are covered by specific provisions of the Clean Air Act.
Unlike TSCA, the other programs require companies to
submit specified data on the safety of new products before they
are introduced into commerce. By definition, however, only
nanomaterials used for these specific types of applications are
covered by these particular programs. Moreover, the FDA
51

acknowledges that, even if a product involving nanotechnology
falls within its ambit, the agency may not even be aware that the
product contains a nanomaterial, “if the manufacturer makes no
nanotechnology claims regarding the manufacture or performance of the product.”60
Finally, the Consumer Product Safety Act (“CPSA”), like
TSCA, does not require pre-market testing of new products.61
As a practical matter, the U.S. Consumer Product Safety
Commission, which administers the CPSA, focuses largely on
injuries and poisonings, rather than chronic toxicity issues.62

ADDRESSING NANOMATERIAL RISKS:
NEXT STEPS

Given the limitations of existing regulatory tools and policies, three distinct kinds of initiatives are urgently needed: first,
a major increase in nanomaterial risk research; second, rapid
development and implementation of voluntary standards of
care, pending development of adequate regulatory safeguards;
and third, updates of existing policies to address the shortcomings described above in addressing nanomaterial risk management. A wide array of stakeholders must be involved in all components of these processes, including labor groups, health
organizations, consumer advocates, community groups, environmental organizations, as well as large and small businesses
and the academic community.

INCREASE GOVERNMENTAL INVESTMENT IN RISK
RESEARCH

The U.S. government, as the largest single investor in nanotechnology research and development, needs to spend more
time and money to assess the health and environmental implications of nanotechnology, and to ensure that the critical research
needed to identify potential risks is conducted expeditiously.
Through the National Nanotechnology Initiative, the federal
government spends more than $1 billion annually on nanotechnology research and development.63 Of this amount, environmental and health implications research accounted for only $8.5
million (less than one percent) in fiscal year (“FY”) 2004.64 This
funding is expected to increase to $38.5 million (less than four
percent) in FY 2006.65
The U.S. government should spend at least $100 million
annually on risk research for the next several years. While an
annual expenditure of $100 million represents a significant
increase over current levels, it is still less than ten percent of
the overall federal budget for nanotechnology development.
Moreover, this amount is a modest investment compared to
the potential benefits of risk avoidance and the $1 trillion role
that nanotechnology is projected to play in the world economy by 2015.
Given the wide-ranging set of research issues that need to
be addressed, and the significant uncertainties associated with
the anticipated results, there is no single “magic number,” nor
precise method to determine the right dollar figure that should
be expended. Nevertheless, $100 million per year represents a
reasonable, lower-bound estimate of what is needed. Experts
broadly agree that addressing the potential risks of nanotechnolSUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

ogy will be an unusually complex task. Despite its name, nanotechnology is anything but singular; it is a potentially limitless
collection of technologies and associated materials. The sheer
diversity of potential materials and applications, which is a
source of nanotechnology’s enormous promise, also poses
major challenges with respect to characterizing potential risks.
A wide range of stakeholders are calling for increased
research. In a rare example of convergence from sectors that
often have highly divergent views, representatives from the
environmental, manufacturing, investment, and insurance communities have all advocated dramatic increases in federal funding on the health and environmental implications of nanotechnology. For example, in June 2005, the CEO of DuPont and the
President of Environmental Defense coauthored an Op-Ed in the
Wall Street Journal, calling for an increase in such funding.66
That same month, the American Chemical Council’s Chemstar
Panel on nanotechnology and Environmental Defense issued a
Joint Statement of Principles, stating that “[a] significant
increase in government investment in research on the health and
environmental implications of nanotechnology is essential.”67 A
recent report on nanotechnology by Innovest, an investment
research and advisory firm, “strongly support[ed] calls by others in the investment community for increased government
funding of toxicology research,” and noted that the National
Nanotechnology Initiative’s “lack of priority for this issue represents a missed opportunity to minimize uncertainty.” 68
Additionally, several of the world’s largest insurance firms,
including Swiss Re,69 Munich Re,70 and Allianz,71 have called
for greater scrutiny of the potential risks of nanotechnology.
Experts’ assessments, testing costs associated with hazard
characterization programs for conventional chemicals, and comparison to the research budgets for a roughly analogous risk
characterization effort on risks of airborne particulate matter
further buttress the call for greatly expanded health and environmental research spending.72
Current federal initiatives on nanotechnology have made
significant achievements in accentuating and accelerating the
enormous potential benefits of nanomaterials. To date, however,
federal agencies have not fulfilled their equally critical role in
identifying, managing, and ideally avoiding the potential downsides. A far better balance between these two roles must be
struck if nanotechnology is to deliver on its promise, without
delivering unintended and unforeseen adverse consequences.
But the U.S. government should not be the sole, or even the
principal, funder of nanomaterial risk research. Other governments are also spending heavily to promote nanotechnology
research and development, and they too should allocate some
portion of their spending to address nanotechnology risks.
Indeed, the United Kingdom’s Royal Society and Royal
Academy of Engineering, in its seminal July 2004 report,
Nanoscience and Nanotechnologies: Opportunities and
Uncertainties, calls for the U.K. government to devote £5-6 million (US $9.5-11.3 million) per annum for ten years, to do its
part to develop the methodologies and instrumentation needed
to set the stage for actual testing of nanomaterials.73
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Although government risk research plays a critical role in
the development of basic knowledge and methods for characterizing and assessing the risks of nanomaterials, private industry
should fund the majority of the research and testing on the products they are planning to bring to the market. In turn, governments should focus on providing the “enabling infrastructure”
for nanotechnology research. Such research cuts across a broad
range of disciplines, and will have broad impacts on society. In
particular, the government can mobilize the research industry to
create a database of representative, model nanomaterials. The
government can also develop methods and tools needed to characterize, detect, and measure nanomaterials; to assess their biological fate and behavior; and to assess acute and chronic toxicity. Most importantly, the government can coordinate this
research, and disseminate the results, thereby increasing efficiency and reducing redundancy. Clearly, all parties involved
will benefit if governments and industry coordinate their
research to avoid redundancy and optimize efficiency.

DEVELOP VOLUNTARY STANDARDS OF CARE

Given that federal agencies are unlikely to develop and
implement adequate regulatory programs for nanomaterials
quickly enough to address the products now entering or poised
to enter the market, voluntary “standards of care” for nanomaterials must play a role in guiding the safe use of nanomaterials in
the near term. These standards should include a framework and
a process by which to identify and manage nanomaterials’ risks
across a product’s full lifecycle, taking into account worker
safety, manufacturing releases, product use, and product disposal. In addition, these standards should incorporate feedback
mechanisms, including environmental and health monitoring
programs, to check the accuracy of judgments made about a
nanomaterial’s risks, and the effectiveness of risk management
practices. Such standards should be developed and implemented in a transparent and accountable manner, including public
disclosure of the assumptions, processes, and results of the risk
identification and risk management systems.
Several voluntary programs are currently at various stages
of evolution, though their eventual outputs are still far from
clear. In November 2005, a workgroup of an EPA advisory committee proposed a framework for a voluntary program aimed at
producers, processors, and users of nanomaterials. The group
also recommended using certain TSCA regulatory authorities to
address nanomaterial risks.74
In addition, both ASTM International75 and the American
National Standards Institute (with the International Standards
Organization)76 have recently initiated multi-stakeholder efforts
to develop voluntary standards for nanotechnology. Both initiatives are at an early stage, and have not yet produced substantive
drafts.
Finally, Environmental Defense and DuPont are working
together to design and demonstrate a framework for the responsible development, production, use, and disposal of nanoscale
materials. While the project will initially pilot-test the framework
on specific nanoscale materials, or on applications of interest to
DuPont, the organizations intend to develop a framework that
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can be adapted for use by a broad range of stakeholders.
But voluntary standards by themselves are only a temporary
expedient; in the longer term, regulatory programs will be
essential to securing long-term public confidence and support
for nanotechnology. Here again, a wide range of stakeholders
believe that a nanotechnology regulatory scheme is needed. In a
survey conducted by the Wilson Center, 55 percent of the 1,250
respondents stated that government control beyond voluntary
standards was necessary, while only eleven percent felt that voluntary standards were adequate.77 According to a recent report
on nanotechnology by Innovest, “[a] significant portion of the
more than 60 companies we interviewed indicated an interest in
having some sort of standards in place. In many cases, they felt
that science-based regulation would provide a more level playing field.”78 In a Joint Statement of Principles submitted to the
EPA, both Environmental Defense and the Nanotechnology
Panel of the American Chemistry Council stated that the responsible regulation of nanomaterials “will best assure that nanomaterials are being developed in a way that identifies and minimizes potential risks to human health and the environment.”79 In
an Op-Ed in the Wall Street Journal, Environmental Defense’s
President, Fred Krupp, and Dupont’s Chairman and CEO, Chad
Holliday, agreed that “both public and business interests will

inevitably compel regulatory protection to ensure product safety and to create a level playing field for business.”80

CONCLUSION

As recently noted by a columnist for the Motley Fool
investment newsletter, “the scientific community will inevitably
determine that at least some nanoscale materials pose unnecessarily high risks.”81 If the public, however, were to discover that
companies knowingly hid or downplayed the risks, it could not
only lead to lawsuits, but might also create a serious backlash
against all things nano. The best-case scenario might be overregulation, while the worst case may be that many nanotechnology-related products are banned altogether.
In an ideal world, adequate data on nanomaterials’ hazards
and exposure would already exist, allowing governments to
establish appropriate safeguards through a transparent public
process that would generate long-term public confidence in nanotechnology. In reality, such data are extremely limited, and regulatory programs are undeveloped. Substantially greater
amounts of government and corporate support for research into
the health and environmental effects of nanomaterials are
urgently needed, along with rapid development of voluntary
standards of care that can help address the issues until meaningful regulations can be put into place.
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